On The Economics of ESOPs – By Richard A Posner

My partner Tom Sigmund does a fair amount of work with ESOPs so he may enjoy this:

I share Becker’s concerns with the favorable tax treatment of employee stock ownership plans. Such treatment would be justifiable only if such plans conferred benefits on society that could not be generated more cheaply by other means. Proponents of the law that authorized ESOPs and conferred favorable tax treatment on them argued that ESOPs would unlock a new source of capital—namely workers, who contribute capital to the corporations that employ them when they take part of their compensation in the form of participation in an ESOP. But there is no shortage of capital, so no justification for subsidizing investment in corporate stock. If anything, ESOPs can be criticized from an overall social-welfare standpoint as an antitakeover device that we do not need: workers are unlikely to vote for a takeover, as it might jeopardize their jobs.

Full post here.

These guys are awesome.

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