Monthly Archive for September, 2007

Distribution standard including the term “welfare” does not create an ascertainable standard.

[Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donoghue, Thorne, Janes & Pagos, 868 N.E.2d 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)]

The court held that a power to invade for the beneficiaries’ “medical care, comfortable maintenance and welfare” is not limited by an ascertainable standard; that the use of the word “welfare” was mistake of law that does not warrant reformation; and that the malpractice suit could proceed although the adverse tax effects of the language would not occur until the beneficiaries’ deaths.

***

In 1988, Norman and Hilda retained an attorney to prepare their Wills. They informed their lawyer that, among other things, they wanted to ensure that the property passing to their children would not be subject to federal estate or state inheritance tax upon their deaths. Their attorney agreed to prepare the Wills in this way and drafted wills and trusts that contained the following provisions regarding the Trustees distributive discretion:

ITEM III. All the residue of my estate and property, wherever situated, including lapsed legacies and devises, but expressly excluding any property over which I may now or hereafter have a power of appointment, I give to FIRST CITIZENS BANK, N.A., as Trustee, to be held and disposed of as follows:

SECTION 1: If my husband survives me, then commencing with my death the Trustee shall pay the income from the trust estate in convenient installments, at least quarterly, to him during his lifetime.
The trustee may also pay to my husband such sums from principal as the Trustee deems necessary or advisable from time to time for his medical care, comfortable maintenance and welfare, considering his income from all sources known to the Trustee.

SECTION 2: Upon the death of my husband, the Trust shall continue and the Norman Sr.’s Will is identical except that his Will leaves his property first to Hilda.

Trustee may pay the income from the Trust Estate in convenient installments, at least quarterly, to my son, NORMAN R. CARLSON, JR., and to his wife, MARGARET ANN CARLSON, and the survivor of them. The Trustee may also pay to my said son, NORMAN R. CARLSON, JR., and/or his said wife, MARGARET ANN CARLSON, such sums from principal as the Trustee deems necessary or advisable from time to time for either of their medical care, comfortable maintenance and welfare, considering the income of either from all sources known to the Trustee.
***
(a) While any grandchild of mine is under the age of twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee shall use for his benefit so much of the income of his share of this trust as the Trustee determines to be required, in addition to his other income from all sources known to the Trustee, for his reasonable support, comfort, welfare, maintenance (including medical, surgical hospital or other institutional care) and education including post high school education adding any excess income to principal at the discretion of the Trustee. After the grandchild reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee shall pay all the current net income of his share of this trust to him in convenient installments at least as often as quarter-annually. The Trustee may in its discretion pay to or use for the benefit of such grandchild so much of the principal of his share of this trust as the Trustee determines to be required, in addition to his respective incomes from all other sources known to the Trustee, for his reasonable support, comfort, welfare, maintenance (including medical, surgical hospital or other institutional care) and education including post high school education, or for any other purpose the Trustee believes to be in the best interests of either of [sic] grandchild.

Well, Norman Sr. died on June 24, 1992, and Hilda died shortly thereafter on August 3, 1992. Hilda’s Will was admitted to probate and Norman Jr. retained counsel in Houston, Texas, to assist with the management of the Trust. In January 1994 (I don’t know why it took so long), his Texas counsel informed Norman Jr. that the language of the Will did not conform to the Treasury Regulations, and as a result, any property remaining in the Trust at the time of Norman Jr. or Margaret’s death would be subject to federal estate tax. Specifically, the Texas counsel felt that the Trust created a general power of appointment, because 26 C.F.R. § 20.2041-1 indicates, “[a] power to use the property for comfort, welfare, or happiness of the holder of the power is not limited by the requisite standard.” (And as we all know general powers of appointment are taxable upon the death of the power’s holder. 26 U.S.C. § 2041(a)(2).)

Counsel was then successful in reforming the trust to read as follows:

The Trustee may also pay to my said son, NORMAN R. CARLSON, JR. and/or his said wife, MARGARET ANN CARLSON, such sums from principal as the Trustee deems necessary from time to time for either of their health and maintenance, considering the income of either from all sources known to the Trustee.

However, counsel who drafted the trust got sued anyways and lost.

On cross-appeal, the Lawyers raise the following issues:

    1) whether the “substantial adverse interest exception” protects the Carlsons from adverse tax consequences;
    2) whether the Carlsons have brought this suit too early, as the IRS has not yet assigned a tax penalty; and
    3) whether the trial court improperly considered the opinion of an attorney hired by the Carlsons.

The court ruled that the adverse interest exception does not protect the Carlsons, the Carlsons are not precluded from bringing their suit at this time, and that the Lawyers waived their argument relating to the opinion of the expert witness by not raising it before the trial court. The court further conclude that the trial court properly found that the original Wills would result in adverse tax consequences, and affirm the trial court’s denial of the Lawyers’ motion for summary judgment on that issue. However, the court also concluded that the reformations did not effectively avoid potential adverse tax consequences..

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Thinking Without Thinking, The Florida Probate Litigation Blog, Stephen Colbert and … Legal Malpractice?

Juan Antunez of The Florida Probate Litigation Blog connected Malcolm Gladwell’s book Blink and legal malpractice in this great post.

The Book:
From Mr. Gladwell’s site, Blink is about “about rapid cognition, about the kind of thinking that happens in a blink of an eye. When you meet someone for the first time, or walk into a house you are thinking of buying, or read the first few sentences of a book, your mind takes about two seconds to jump to a series of conclusions. Well, “Blink” is a book about those two seconds, because I think those instant conclusions that we reach are really powerful and really important and, occasionally, really good.”

Legal Malpractice:
Juan’s discusses two cases (here and here) about “a $71 million jury verdict entered against a large Texas firm for estate planning malpractice even though this same jury found that the client had suffered zero economic damages; and [...] a $1.2 million jury verdict against a large Florida firm for estate planning malpractice even though the plaintiff in that case alleged only $1 million in damages.”

Juan’s point is that “non-economic factors were far more important than economic factors in determining the outcome of these cases.”

An excerpt from the book about medical malpractice:

Believe it or not, the risk of being sued for malpractice has very little to do with how many mistakes a doctor makes. Analyses of malpractice lawsuits show that there are highly skilled doctors who get sued a lot and doctors who make lots of mistakes and never get sued. At the same time, the overwhelming number of people who suffer an injury due to the negligence of a doctor never file a malpractice suit at all. In other words, patients don’t file lawsuits because they’ve been harmed by shoddy medical care. Patients file lawsuits because they’ve been harmed by shoddy medical care and something else happens to them.

What is that something else? It’s how they were treated, on a personal level, by their doctor. What comes up again and again in malpractice cases is that patients say they were rushed or ignored or treated poorly. “People just don’t sue doctors they like,” is how Alice Burkin, a leading medical malpractice lawyer, puts it. “In all the years I’ve been in this business, I’ve never had a potential client walk in and say, ‘I really like this doctor, and I feel terrible about doing it, but I want to sue him.’ We’ve had people come in saying they want to sue some specialist, and we’ll say, ‘We don’t think that doctor was negligent. We think it’s your primary care doctor who was at fault.’ And the client will say, ‘I don’t care what she did. I love her, and I’m not suing her.’”

“Don’t be a jerk.” “Nice trumps negligence”

I love this! I never would have put the two together (probably because I haven’t read the book yet). Reading Juan’s post reminded that Mr. Gladwell had been on The Colbert Report. The video is below for your enjoyment:



Thanks Juan!

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Allegation of forgery does not trigger forfeiture under in terrorem clause

This link from the Wills, Trusts & Estates Prof Blog September 7:

The testator’s will included a no-contest clause which mandated a forfeiture by the recipient of a bequest to be distributed among two or more persons if the beneficiary disputes the executor’s decision on how to make distribution of specific bequests.

Two beneficiaries applied to contest the will based on an expert determination that the testator’s signature was a forgery.

In Harrison v. Morrow, No. 1060300, 2007 WL 1953896 (Ala. July 6, 2007), the court held that the no-contest clause applies only to challenges to the executor’s decisions about the distribution of specific bequests and not to a contest of the will itself.

The right decision I think.

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Leona Helmsley’s Will and Pet Trusts in Ohio

Leona Helmsley’s will appears to have spurred an increased interest in leaving money for one’s pet.

As previously reported on this blog, in Ohio, one can now leave money in trust for their pet (or pets) and be assured that such reserved funds will actually be applied to the care of one’s pet(s). Ohio’s new trust code (adopted just this year) specifically authorizes the creation of a trust to provide care of an animal:

5804.08 Trust to provide for care of animal.
(A) A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor’s lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor’s lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal.

(B) A person appointed in the terms of a trust or, if no person is so appointed, a person appointed by the court may enforce a trust authorized by this section. A person having an interest in the welfare of an animal that is provided care by a trust authorized by this section may request the court to appoint a person to enforce the trust or to remove a person appointed.

(C) The property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its intended use, except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for the intended use. Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, property not required for the intended use must be distributed to the settlor if then living or to the settlor’s successors in interest.

Effective Date: 01-01-2007

The Louisiana Pet Lawyer Blog previously posted to an article written by an attorney here in my backyard, Julie Mills from Worthington, Ohio.

An excerpt of Julie Article:

A statutory trust for the care of a pet will care for one designated pet or several pets. If the settlor, or person who creates the trust, has a statutory trust prepared to care for all animals in the settlor’s care at the settlor’s death, the trust will care for any animals in gestation as well.

A trust for the care of a pet must be funded with an amount considered reasonable in light of what amount is needed to care for the animal or animals. Such an amount should be calculated by the settlor using factors such as estimated veterinary bills, food expenses, recreation costs (toys, dog parks, etc.), occasional boarding costs (plan financially for one or two weeks a year), life span (a dog’s general life expectancy is 15 years, while a parrot’s can be 80 years), and burial or cremation expenses (burying or cremating a cat is much different financially—and logistically—than burying or cremating a horse).

If a court determines that a trust’s funds are excessive and unreasonable, the court will distribute the excess to the settlor or settlor’s beneficiaries or heirs. This might create a conflict between beneficiaries or heirs, and the welfare of the pet. To avoid this result, do not grossly overfund the trust to lessen the chances of a beneficiary or heir challenging the trust. Another option would be to designate any excess funds to a charity. A good rule of thumb is to calculate the amount that would be required to board your pet for the remainder of its life and use that amount to fund the trust.

I have not yet had the opportunity to draft a trust of this kind and, while I can’t be sure how much of Ms. Mill’s statements regarding what a court would do are accurate given the youth of the statute, her advice is reasonable and sounds entirely prudent.

Professor Gary Beyer of the Wills, Trusts & Estates Prof Blog has written a very thorough 20 Question FAQ regarding pet trusts on his website that you should also check out:

    What is a “pet trust”?
    How does a pet trust work?
    What are the main types of pet trusts?
    Which type of pet trust is “better”?
    What if my state does not have a special law authorizing pet trusts?
    When is a pet trust created?
    Which is better – an inter vivos or testamentary pet trust?
    What does it mean to “fund” your pet trust?

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Same-Sex Marriage in Iowa… Iowa?

For about 4 hours anyways…

As reported here and here, the Iowa District Court for Polk County held in Varnum v. Brien that the Iowa law prohibiting individuals of the same sex from marrying violates “due process and equal protection rights.”

From Professor Berry and the Wills, Trusts & Estates Prof Blog:

Same-sex couples flocked to Des Moines to get married. However, most were disappointed because the same judge, Robert B. Hanson, delayed granting licenses until the Iowa Supreme court decides whether to hear an appeal of his opinion.

In the “gap” period, however, one fast-acting couple, Timothy McQuillan and Sean Fritz, were able to obtain a marriage license and successfully get married.

From the NYT:

The chance [for same-sex couples to wed] was fleeting. After four hours, Robert B. Hanson, the same county judge who had deemed the ban on same-sex marriages unconstitutional, delayed further granting of licenses until the Iowa Supreme Court decided whether to consider an appeal.

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